In service: 10-8 Vol.6: Iss.3, 2006 by Justice Institute of British Columbia (Justice Institute of British Columbia) (Author)
POLICE ACADEMY 
715 McBride Blvd. New Westminster B.C. V3L 5T4 
IN SERVICE:10-8 
A PEER READ PUBLICATION 
 
A newsletter devoted to operational police officers across British Columbia. 
Volume 6 Issue 3 Be Smart and Stay Safe 
May/June 2006 
 
IN MEMORIAL 
 
On April 20, 2006 40-year-old 
Abbotsford Police Department 
Constable John Goyer passed 
away after a lengthy and 
courageous battle with 
Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis 
(ALS), also known as Lou Gehrig's disease, 
brought on by an on duty fight arresting a 
suspect. 
 
In September, 2001 Constable 
Goyer, along with his partner, 
attended to a threatening 
report.  The suspect in the 
incident refused to be taken 
into custody and it was during 
the resulting violent physical confrontation that 
Constable Goyer became injured.  He underwent 
several medical tests and it was soon learned 
that his progressing weakness was brought on by 
ALS. 
 
Medical professionals and a Worksafe BC 
adjudicator concluded Constable 
Goyer’s ALS was caused as a 
direct result of the fight and his 
employment as a police officer.  
Cst. Goyer had served as a police 
officer for eight years.  
* * * 
On May 5, 2006 37-year-old 
Windsor Police Service 
Constable John Atkinson was 
shot and killed while 
questioning two suspicious men 
he observed at a convenience 
store in a residential area. 
 
 
While questioning the men one of them produced 
a handgun and opened fire. 
 
Despite being wounded, 
Constable Atkinson was able to 
return fire as the suspects 
fled. Two 18-year-old men were 
arrested a short time later. 
 
Constable Atkinson had served with the Windsor 
Police for 15 years. He is survived by his wife 
and two young children. 
* * * 
On May 14, 2006 41-year-old 
Sault Ste. Marie Police 
Service Senior Constable Don 
Doucet was killed in an 
automobile accident. Constable 
Doucet was a passenger in 
police cruiser when it collided with a van. Both 
officers and the driver of the van were taken to 
the hospital by ambulance. Constable Doucet was 
critically injured and succumbed to his injuries 
shortly after the collision. The police officer 
who was driving the cruiser was treated for non-
life-threatening injuries.  
 
The driver of the van was charged 
with impaired driving causing 
death, impaired driving causing 
bodily harm, and driving with a 
blood alcohol content exceeding 
80mg%.  
 
Constable Doucet was a 12-year veteran and was 
currently assigned to Patrol Services. He is 
survived by his wife and two daughters.  
 
The preceding information was provided by the 
Abbotsford Police and the Officer Down Memorial 
Page: available at www.odmp.org/Canada 
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e-LETTERS TO THE EDITOR 
 
 “Thanks for all you do. It is 
greatly appreciated by 
many!”—Police Constable, 
British Columbia 
************ 
“I have just been forwarded a copy of…In 
Service: 10-8 and found it very interesting and 
"readable”… Thank you for your commitment to 
keeping us informed!”—Police Constable, RCMP 
British Columbia 
************ 
“I've just recently read the "In Service: 10-8" 
newsletter and found it to be of interest.  I 
would like to be added onto your electronic 
distribution list, if possible. I am [a] Security 
Manager…and retired member of the RCMP.  I 
find that some of the articles most certainly 
apply and will assist our Security Team, where 
applicable.”—Security Manager, British 
Columbia 
************ 
“I would be grateful if you could add me to your 
publication list.  I am the new legal training co-
ordinator for the [department],…and your hard 
work makes…my job much easier. Thanks…”—
Police Constable, British Columbia 
************ 
”I miss getting the newsletter since I 
graduated from the JI in January 2004.  I go 
on-line occasionally and read it but I would like 
to get it at work... The rest of my squad would 
like to read it also and I can make copies of it 
there.  Thanks very much, it is a very 
informative read and a good way to stay up 
to date.”—Police Constable, British Columbia 
 
All past editions of this 
newsletter are now available 
online by clicking on to:  
www.10-8.ca 
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‘IN SERVICE’ LEGAL ROAD      
TEST 
 
The “In Service” Legal 
Road Test is a simple 
multiple choice quiz 
designed to challenge 
your understanding of the law. Each question is 
based on a case featured in this issue. In this 
issue, two of the questions are based on 
statistical information. See page 17 for the 
answers. 
 
1. Who is most likely to wear a seat belt? 
(a) a 54-year-old woman in Saskatchewan 
driving a minivan downtown; 
(b) a 32-year-old man in Alberta travelling in 
the back seat of a SUV in the country; 
(c) a 23-year-old woman in Quebec travelling 
in the front passenger seat of a pickup 
downtown; or 
(d) a 73-year-old man from the Northwest 
Territories driving a passenger car in the 
country.  
 
2. Questioning a detainee can sometimes be the 
beginning of a search for the purposes of s.8 
of the Charter. 
(a) true 
(b) false 
 
3. When a fellow police officer relies on the 
direction of a colleague to conduct a search, 
the searching officer must independently 
have reasonable grounds (subjective/ 
objective analysis)  
(a) true 
(b) false 
 
4. Which of the following justice system 
personnel do Canadians trust the most? 
(a) Judges 
(b) Lawyers 
(c) Police 
(d)   Politicians (law makers) 
 
 
SEARCH WARRANT  
TIME FRAMES:  
IN or IN AND OUT? 
 
Anyone who has seen a 
search warrant has 
noticed that there will 
be a time frame 
outlined on its face. 
This period is inserted 
by a justice and 
requires the police to take some action within 
these parameters. But what action must be 
taken? Are the police required to be in and out 
within that time? Or are the police required to 
just enter in that time and can they carry the 
search over past the end time listed? Although 
there is not a lot of case law on this matter, 
there are a few cases that can provide some 
guidance for officers and, perhaps, clear up 
some of the debate.  
 
In R. v. Cardinal, 2003 BCSC 158, the police 
obtained a telewarrant to enter the accused’s 
residence between 5:15 pm and 8:00 pm the 
same day. At 7:14 pm officers entered the house 
and remained inside until 11:00 pm. During a voir 
dire in the Supreme Court of British Columbia on 
a charge of possessing cocaine for the purpose 
of trafficking, the accused argued the police 
failed to comply with the warrant by staying in 
the house until 11:00 pm, three hours past the 
8:00 pm expiry. This, he argued, violated his 
right under s.8 of the Charter to be secure 
against unreasonable search or seizure. Justice 
Chamberlist, however, ruled that only entry need 
be gained between the times specified on the 
warrant. There was no requirement that the 
search be completed between those times. 
 
In R. v. Woodall, [1991] O.J. No. 3563 (OntCJ), 
the police obtained a search warrant to enter 
the accused’s residence between 6:00 pm and 
9:00 pm. Police moved in at 8:48 pm and saw 
many items. The house was secured and it took a 
considerable length of time to carry out the 
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seizure of more than 200 items. The seizures 
were not concluded until two days later. In the 
Ontario Court of Justice the accused argued the 
search warrant became invalid after 9:00 pm. 
Judge Higgins, however, disagreed: 
 
In the peculiar circumstances of this case and 
without ruling that in all situations only entry 
is required by a specified hour to prevent a 
search warrant from lapsing, I find that the 
search warrant first obtained on August 
7th…did not lapse at 9:00 p.m that night, and 
that it remained operative and cloaking all 
activity conducted until the police finally left 
the premises with the thus lawfully seized 
articles on August the 9th. [para. 61]   
 
In Pars Oriental Rug v. Canada, [1988] B.C.J. No. 
3055 (BCSC), Customs officers obtained a 
search warrant under the Customs Act to search 
a business between 9:30 am and 6:00 pm. 
Officers entered at about 10:00 am and began 
to seize rugs imported into Canada. Some were 
seized before 6:00 pm while others after. The 
judge found the entry and search were 
restricted to the times specified in the warrant 
and that the entire execution process must be 
completed within the times indicated. Therefore, 
after 6:00 pm the warrant was of no force or 
effect.  
 
The Attorney General then made application in 
British Columbia Supreme Court arguing that 
only entry was required between the times 
specified and that once inside the time 
constraint disappeared and the authorities could 
take as much time as reasonably necessary to do 
the search and make the seizures. Justice Wood, 
in chambers, did not agree. The wording in the 
warrant was ambiguous. It read: 
 
THIS is, therefore, to authorize and require 
you between the hours of 9:30 am. July 29th, 
1988 to 6:00 p.m… July 29th, 1988 to enter 
into the said premises and to search for the 
said things and to seize same, if found.  
 
Justice Wood stated: 
 
The starting point of this inquiry must 
necessarily be the language of the warrant 
itself.  Mr. Justice Paris found that language 
ambiguous.  I agree.  If as suggested, the time 
period described therein was intended only to 
set the limits within which entry into the 
premises may be effected and the search 
begun, it would have been reasonable, not to 
mention grammatically preferable, to place the 
phrase "between the hours of 9:30 a.m. July 
29th, 1988 to 6:00 pm. July 29th, 1988" 
immediately after the word "premises." 
Worded the way it is, that clause of the 
warrant clearly lends itself to the 
construction that not only the time of entry 
but also the authorized search and resulting 
seizures if any, are restricted to the time 
frame described. [emphasis added, para. 6] 
 
The application was dismissed, while in another 
application, [1998] B.C.J. No. 3054 (BCSC), the 
rugs seized after 6:00 pm were ordered 
returned.  
 
The present wording of a British Columbia 
Criminal Code search warrant is consistent with 
Justice Wood’s analysis that the time frame be 
grammatically located after the word 
“premises” in order that entry is only required 
within the time frame mentioned. British 
Columbia search warrant wording reads: 
 
However, entering too early or staying too late 
after the search is effectively completed can 
pose serious problems. 
 
In R. v. L.S.U. (1999) Docket:X051691 (BCSC), 
the police obtained a search warrant to enter 
the accused’s residence between 2:30 pm and 
8:30 pm. However, the police entered at 2:18 pm, 
12 minutes before the time specified on the 
warrant, but did not seize anything until 2:34 pm. 
During a voir dire in the Supreme Court of 
British Columbia Justice Stromberg-Stein found 
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the search unreasonable. Because police entered 
before the time specified in the warrant, the 
search was in effect warrantless and therefore 
prima facie unreasonable. There were no exigent 
circumstances, no safety concerns, and the 
search could not otherwise be justified.  
 
In R. v. Moran, 21 O.A.C. 257 (OntCA), the police 
were investigating a murder and applied for a 
warrant to search the accused’s premises. At 
9:30 am police found a knife in a shed. Prior to 
warrant expiry at 9:00 pm, two police officers 
hid in the attic of the shed to watch and see if 
the accused would return and approach the 
knife. At 08:27 am the following morning the 
accused returned, looked up into the attic, and 
the officers fled. The trial judge ruled a 
“trespass occurred substantially after any right 
of access to the premises afforded by the 
search warrant had expired and was…without 
legal justification,” violating s.8 of the Charter. 
In determining whether the trial judge properly 
admitted the evidence on appeal to the Ontario 
Court of Appeal, Justice Martin stated: 
 
The privilege or right of the police to be on 
the [accused’s] premises terminated on the 
expiry of the warrant and they became 
trespassers at common law by remaining on the 
[accused’s] land after the search had been 
completed. No request to leave was necessary 
at common law.  
 
From the preceding case law, depending on the 
wording of the search warrant, it appears that 
only entry need be gained within the scope of 
the time frame outlined on the face of the 
warrant. Any search may extend beyond the time 
frame provided it is reasonably necessary for 
the completion of the search. For example, the 
area to be searched is large or the removal of 
items will take a considerable amount of time. If 
the items listed in the warrant are located, the 
search is completed and there would be no 
further practical reason to remain at the 
location. Under these circumstances it may not 
be reasonable for the police to stay on the 
premises. 
DID YOU KNOW… 
 
…that Transport Canada 
recently released its 
report, Surveys of 
Seatbelt Use in Canada1. 
The 2006 report showing 
seatbelt usage for 2004-2005 shows that 
seatbelt usage has risen in Canada by about 3% 
since the last survey taken in 2002-2003. Other 
highlights of the survey include: 
 
• Front seat occupants (90.8%) are more likely 
to wear seatbelts than back seat occupants 
(84.9%) 
 
• People 50 years of age and older (92.1%) are 
more likely to wear seatbelts than people 
aged 25 to 49 (91.8%) and people less than 25 
years of age (87.0%) 
 
• Females (93.9%) are more likely to wear 
seatbelts than males (89.9%) 
 
• Urban vehicle occupants (91.1%) are more 
likely to wear a seatbelt than rural vehicle 
occupants (86.9%) 
 
• Drivers of passenger cars, minivans, and SUVs 
(91.9%) are more likely to wear seat belts 
than pickup trucks (84.8%) 
 
Of all provinces and territories in Canada, people 
in Saskatchewan wear their seatbelts most often 
while people in the Northwest Territories buckle 
up the least. Results across all regions (except 
Nunavut) are as follows: 
                                                 
1 Transport Canada’s Surveys of Seat Belt Use in Canada 2004-2005, Fact Sheet 
TP 2436 E, RS-2006-01E, February 2006 
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MARIHUANA SMELL & ODD 
BEHAVIOUR PROVIDE 
REASONABLE GROUNDS 
R. v. Luu & Tran, 2006 BCCA 73 
 
After responding to a parking 
complaint, a police officer went 
to a basement suite door to ask 
the owner of the vehicle to move 
it. A female voice said “Who’s 
there?” and the officer told her he was a 
member of the police department and asked her 
to open the door. The two accused, a male and 
female, opened the door, stepped onto the 
landing, and closed the door behind them. While 
discussing the vehicle, the officer noted a smell 
of marihuana. He asked the female for 
identification and she appeared nervous.  
 
She went back into the suite while the male 
closed the door behind her enough that the 
officer could not see inside. The officer then 
smelled an overwhelming odour of bulk 
marihuana. The male then said something 
Vietnamese to the female. The officer grabbed 
the male by the arm and advised him he was 
under arrest. The male pulled backwards and 
they both stumbled into the suite. After a 
violent struggle the male was handcuffed. The 
female was also arrested and they were both 
seated on the couch.  
 
The officer quickly searched the suite to ensure 
no one else was present. In the computer room 
he saw a large garbage bag and small plastic bags 
containing marihuana. He called for assistance 
and read the accused their right to counsel 
about 20 minutes after entry. They both asked 
to call a lawyer but an opportunity was not 
provided because the officer could not afford 
them privacy. While waiting for a wagon, the 
officer asked the male where he lived. A search 
warrant was subsequently obtained and 25 lbs of 
marihuana bagged in ½ lb quantities was seized.  
 
At trial in British Columbia Provincial Court on 
charges of marihuana possession for the purpose 
of trafficking the judge found the warrantless 
arrests lawful. In his view, the officer had the 
requisite subjective belief and objective 
grounds. Further, the initial warrantless search 
was also lawful. The officer did not deliberately 
enter the suite, but rather it occurred during 
the struggle. The additional search of the suite 
was justified to ensure officer safety. Seeing 
the marihuana in the computer room was 
therefore lawful.  
 
The judge found the officer’s delay in reading 
the accused their rights was justified since the 
officer was alone and maintaining control of the 
situation until assistance arrived. The further 10 
minute delay from the time the accused were 
read their rights and removed from the scene 
was also reasonable. The evidence was admissible 
and the accused were convicted.  
 
Both accused appealed to the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal arguing the trial judge erred in 
finding their ss. 8, 9, and 10(b) Charter rights 
were not violated. They argued their arrests and 
the subsequent search were unlawful and that 
their right to counsel had been breached. 
 
The British Columbia Court of Appeal dismissed 
the accused’s ss.8 and 9 Charter arguments. The 
officer believed he had reasonable grounds to 
make an arrest and those grounds were 
objectively justified. The smell of marihuana may 
provide reasonable grounds to make an arrest 
depending on the circumstances. Justice Smith 
stated: 
 
I am not persuaded that the trial judge made 
any error in this reasoning.  Ms. Luu’s 
demeanour and Mr. Tran’s sudden shift from 
English to a language foreign to [the officer] 
were relevant circumstances.  An objective 
observer in the shoes of [the officer] might 
have attributed Ms. Luu’s nervousness to his 
sudden presence at the door in the dark, as 
her counsel suggests.  However, such an 
observer might also have reasonably concluded, 
considering the smell of marihuana and the odd 
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behaviour of the [accused] in joining him in 
such close quarters on the landing and in 
closing the door behind them, that her 
apparent nervousness arose from a fear that 
she was in danger of being implicated in 
criminal activity.  If so, the objective 
observer, unable to see what was inside the 
suite, might well be alarmed by the sudden 
shift of the [accused] Tran from English to a 
language the observer did not understand.  
While it might have been open to the trial 
judge to draw innocent inferences from these 
matters, the drawing of factual inferences 
from the evidence was within his exclusive 
province.  His inferences were grounded in the 
evidence and I would reject the submission 
that he erred in concluding there were 
objectively reasonable grounds for the 
arrests.  [para. 23] 
 
Nor was the arrest of the female unlawful 
because it was made inside a private dwelling 
without a warrant. The suite was entered 
because of the struggle, not deliberately, 
forcibly, or for the purpose of arresting the 
female. Since there were reasonable grounds for 
the arrest the accused were not arbitrarily 
detained. The cursory search that followed for 
officer safety was also justified. 
 
The delay, however, in providing access to 
counsel was a s.10 Charter breach along with 
questioning following arrest. Justice Smith 
explained: 
 
In my view, the trial judge erred in rejecting 
this submission on the basis that the delay at 
the scene was very short and was not 
unreasonable in the circumstances.  In R. v. 
Strachan, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 980, Dickson C.J.C. 
observed…that once police have the arrest 
scene under control, there is no reason not to 
allow the person arrested to telephone a 
lawyer and that the denial of the s. 10(b) right 
to counsel begins at that point.  Chief Justice 
Lamer, speaking for the court in R. v. 
Manninen, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1233…stated that, 
where a telephone is available, it is the duty of 
the police to offer the use of it to facilitate 
contact with counsel, at least in the absence 
of urgency.  There was no urgency here and 
there were telephones available to be used in 
the residence where the [accused] were 
arrested.  Moreover, that [the officer] 
believed he could not offer the [accused] 
privacy is no answer to his failure to do his 
duty.  In R. v. Bui, 2005 BCCA 482, this Court 
upheld the decision of a trial judge that the 
failure to give the [accused] in that case the 
option of contacting counsel without privacy 
amounted to an infringement of their s. 10(b) 
rights.  
 
As well, [the officer] questioning of Mr. Tran 
at the scene, after he had advised Mr. Tran of 
his right to counsel, was a second infringement 
of the s. 10(b) right. [para. 30-31] 
 
Despite these violations, the evidence was 
admitted under s.24(2) and the appeal was 
dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
QUESTIONING CAN BE THE 
START OF A SEARCH 
R. v. Rutten, 2006 SKCA 17 
 
After observing a vehicle driven 
with a burnt out headlight the 
police followed it to a car wash, 
pulled in behind it, and the 
driver got out.  The accused 
admitted to having a couple of beer after work 
and said there was no open liquor in the truck. 
The officer asked if he could take a look inside 
and was told to go ahead. An open bottle of beer 
was seen in the console and removed. The officer 
then asked if there were any drugs in the truck, 
even though he had no reasonable grounds to 
believe such.  
 
The officer asked if he could take a look. The 
accused paused, then reached into the back seat 
of the truck, removing a Bick’s pickle jar and 
handed it to the officer. There was marihuana, 
rolling papers, and scissors inside. The accused 
was arrested for possession of a controlled 
substance, but was not read his rights.  
 
 8            www.10-8.ca Volume 6 Issue 3 
  May/June 2006 
The officer saw a shaving kit bag on the floor, 
picked it up and asked the accused if he could 
take a look in it. The accused said “No”, grabbed 
the bag from the officer and put it back in the 
truck. The officer put the accused in the police 
car, advised him of his right to counsel and gave 
the police warning. He wanted to speak to a 
lawyer but was told he could do so at the police 
detachment. The shaving bag was examined and 
found to contain cocaine. The vehicle was seized 
and a search warrant was obtained the next day. 
The shaving bag was found to hold 43.5 grms of 
cocaine and other evidence.  
 
At trial in the Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s 
Bench, the judge found the accused’s rights 
under s.8 of the Charter had not been breached. 
In her view, the police had the authority to 
arrest the accused under the Alcohol and Gaming 
Regulation Act and could search incident to that 
arrest. Furthermore, the judge also found the 
accused consented to the search.  
 
The accused appealed to the Saskatchewan 
Court of Appeal arguing, in part, that the search 
was for drugs while the right to arrest arose in 
relation to open alcohol and therefore was not 
valid as an incident to arrest. He also submitted 
that the consent was not valid. Although he 
conceded the police could investigate him for 
the alcohol offence, the accused suggested he 
was also arbitrarily detained once the police 
shifted their focus to drugs.  
 
Search Incident To Arrest 
 
Justice Smith, writing the Court’s judgment, 
agreed with the accused. Once the officer asked 
whether there were any drugs in the truck a 
search for drugs began. However, questioning 
the accused about the presence of drugs was not 
justified as a search incidental to an arrest for 
an alcohol offence. Justice Smith stated: 
 
With respect, I am of the view that the 
learned trial judge erred in concluding that 
the inquiry as to the presence of drugs in the 
vehicle fell within authority of the police to 
search the vehicle incidental to the earlier 
discovery of one open bottle of beer in the 
driver’s console.  It is clear from the 
transcript that the question to the [accused] 
related only to the presence of drugs in the 
vehicle.  Nothing in what had happened to that 
point gave the police reasonable and probable 
grounds to believe that drugs were present in 
the vehicle.  The officer’s question was not an 
inquiry about the presence of other open 
alcohol.  Nor did the officers make such an 
inquiry at any point.  Neither was it an inquiry 
about the sobriety of the [accused].  The 
officers testified that nothing in the 
[accused’s] manner of driving, nor in his 
responses when talking to him, nor in his 
physical appearance gave rise to any concerns 
that he was impaired.  Indeed, the officers 
did not pose any further questions relating to 
the presence of alcohol or relating to the 
[accused’s] sobriety.  He was not asked to 
perform any sobriety tests. 
 
While it is true that the police had statutory 
authority to arrest the [accused] in relation to 
the offence of having an open bottle of beer in 
his vehicle, they did not do so and in reality 
had no reason to do so.  The [accused] was 
known to them as a resident and businessman 
in the village where the detention occurred. 
There were, as I have said, no concerns about 
his sobriety. The officers had no concerns 
about their own safety or the safety of others 
on the highway.  The offence in question was 
punishable by a fine. As for searching for 
further evidence on the offence in question, 
the police had already noted an open case of 
beer in the truck box.  There was only one 
occupant of the vehicle, the [accused], who 
showed no symptoms of impairment, and it was 
unreasonable to expect that there would be 
other open alcohol in the vehicle.  In my 
respectful view, these facts are open to no 
other reasonable interpretation than that the 
police were launching an unrelated 
investigation, possibly based on unverified 
rumour, but in any case not supported by 
reasonable and probable grounds, of a possible 
offence under the Controlled Drugs and 
Substances Act. [paras. 24-25] 
 
And further: 
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[T]here is both a subjective and an objective 
aspect to the question of the purpose of the 
search said to be incidental to arrest.  In the 
case at bar, the question posed to the 
[accused] was whether there were any drugs in 
the truck.  When asked why he posed that 
question, [the officer’s] response, on evidence-
in-chief, was: 
 
It’s just part of our general inquiries in 
vehicle stops to ask if there’s drugs or 
alcohol in the truck or if people have 
been drinking or… 
 
The courts have, on a number of occasions, 
made it clear that an investigation or inquiry 
into the possible possession of contraband is 
not permissible as part of “general inquiries in 
vehicle stops,” absent other grounds for the 
inquiry…[The officer] conceded that he had no 
grounds to believe that there were drugs in 
the truck… 
 
The [Crown] argues that the police were 
entitled to search for more open alcohol in the 
vehicle and, in doing so, they would inevitably 
have found the drugs.  I am of the view that 
this rationale cannot justify the search as one 
incident to the arrest.  The evidence is that 
this was not the subjective purpose of the 
officers.  [The officer] admitted on cross-
examination that, at the time he asked if 
there were drugs in the vehicle, and then if he 
could search the vehicle, he did not believe 
that he had reasonable and probable grounds 
to search the vehicle. It is impossible to 
conclude that this officer’s subjective reason 
for searching the vehicle was incidental to an 
arrest for an open bottle of beer in the 
driver’s console. 
 
Even if, contrary to the evidence, the 
subjective purpose of the questioning and 
ensuing search had been in relation to the 
presence of alcohol in the vehicle, it is not 
obvious that a search limited in scope to that 
purpose would have disclosed the drugs which 
were concealed in a Bick’s pickle jar and in a 
shaving kit, both unlikely places to conceal 
open bottles of alcohol. [paras. 28-31, ] 
 
 
 
Consent 
 
As for valid consent to search, the Court found 
the requirement that a person be aware of their 
right to refuse a search was not met. Justice 
Smith held: 
 
It is my respectful view that the trial judge 
failed to consider the requirements for valid 
consent and the onus of proof on the Crown in 
this respect.  The police in this case did not 
make even minimal efforts to ensure that the 
[accused] was aware of his constitutionally 
protected right to refuse a search for drugs.  
Application of the proper test leads to the 
conclusion that the consent obtained was not 
valid and cannot be relied upon to render 
lawful or reasonable the search for drugs 
undertaken by the police in the absence of 
reasonable and probable grounds to believe 
that drugs were present in the truck. [para. 
44]  
 
Arbitrary Detention 
 
The Court, however, rejected the accused’s 
submission that he had been arbitrarily 
detained when the police made their unlawful 
enquiry about drugs:  
 
In the present case, neither the initial 
detention to speak to the driver about a 
malfunctioning headlight, nor the subsequent 
detention in relation to the open beer in the 
vehicle was arbitrary.  Thus, it was not 
necessary to rely upon s. 1 of the Charter to 
justify the detention and no inquiry into the 
limits of s. 1 justification was required.  
Mellenthin and Ladouceur (Sask. C.A.) are 
therefore not on point.  While I have held that 
these reasons for detention did not authorize 
a search for contraband drugs, it is my view 
that it does not follow that the [accused] was 
arbitrarily detained in these circumstances.  
Indeed, that was not the finding in Mellenthin, 
which concluded that the random stop could 
not in itself justify a search for drugs, but did 
not address the question of whether the 
[accused’s] s. 9 rights were also infringed in 
the circumstances of that case.  Ladouceur, on 
the other hand, is a finding that the initial 
stop, for purposes going beyond highway 
safety concerns, was unlawful. 
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In the instant case, the detention of the 
[accused] was justified, initially pursuant to 
The Highway Traffic Act and subsequently 
pursuant to The Alcohol and Gaming 
Regulations Act, 1997.  The [accused’s] 
argument turns on the fact that in the course 
of the admittedly lawful detention the police 
embarked on an unlawful inquiry.  I agree that 
they did, and have found that that constituted 
an unreasonable search.  However, it does not 
follow that once the police embarked on an 
inquiry about drugs the detention in relation to 
the mechanical unfitness of the vehicle and 
alcohol present in the vehicle became 
arbitrary.  The [accused’s] argument would 
lead to the conclusion that once the police mis-
stepped, by embarking on an inquiry not 
justified by the purposes of the detention, 
they automatically lost all the legitimate 
authority they had to detain the [accused] on 
the original grounds, or to pursue the inquiries 
in relation to those grounds.  I cannot agree 
with this analysis.  The police were still 
entitled, had they wished to do so, to make 
further inquiries concerning the presence of 
alcohol or concerning the mechanical fitness of 
the vehicle. The point in the present case is 
not that the detention of the [accused] was 
arbitrary; it is that the search for drugs was 
unreasonable.  I find no error in the conclusion 
of the learned trial judge that the [accused] 
was lawfully detained. [paras. 58-59] 
 
The evidence was excluded under s.24(2), the 
conviction set aside, and an acquittal was 
entered.  
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
 
JUDGE NEED NOT CHECK 
COMMON SENSE AT DOOR 
R. v. Mowry, 2006 NBCA 18 
 
Acting on source information the 
police attended a remote and 
uninhabited area of Crown land 
where they found 175 marihuana 
plants growing in a clearing. The 
officers left and returned a few months later. 
The plants had grown a few feet, were dry, and 
their leaves were yellow. The following day the 
police returned and conducted surveillance. The 
accused and two others arrived and were 
videotaped for about 12 minutes. In the video 
tape the accused could be seen moving around 
the plants and bending over at the waist, 
however his hands were not in view. The other 
two men were seen involved in activities such as 
pruning, carrying a water bucket, or holding a 
hose.  
 
At trial in New Brunswick Provincial Court the 
accused was convicted of marihuana production. 
“Produce” in the Controlled Drugs and 
Substances Act means to obtain a substance by 
cultivating, which includes any act designed to 
help raise plants, such as the preparation and use 
of the soil, the removal of weeds from the 
vicinity of the plants, and pruning. An appeal to 
the New Brunswick Court of Queen’s Bench was 
dismissed.  
 
The accused appealed further to the New 
Brunswick Court of Appeal arguing that the trial 
judge’s verdict was unreasonable because the 
video did not show what he was doing with his 
hands—he was not seen touching the plants or 
handling any watering equipment. Chief Justice 
Drapeau, writing the unanimous opinion, 
dismissed the appeal.  He stated: 
 
The trial judge was not required to check her 
common sense at the courtroom door. A 
contextual commonsensical appreciation of 
what [the accused] is shown doing on the 
videotape leads inescapably to the conclusion 
that he was engaged in cultivating the cannabis 
(marihuana) plants that are the subject of the 
underlying charge and the impugned conviction. 
It is obvious from the video that [the men] 
were operating as a team, each doing his part 
to help the plants’ growth. The trial judge 
properly assessed [the accused’s] actions in 
the context provided by the evidence as a 
whole, including the actions of his two 
plantation co-workers. [para. 14] 
 
The conviction was upheld. 
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
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REASONABLE FORCE OK TO 
ENSURE DETAINEE NOT 
ARMED 
R. v. Gillies, 2006 BCPC 0053 
 
A police officer patrolling in his 
police car saw the accused 
walking in an extremely high 
prostitution and drug offence 
area. As the car approached, the accused took a 
180 degree turn and began to walk away. The 
officer pulled up beside the accused and said, 
“Hey buddy, how you doin? What’s your name?” 
through an open window. The officer saw a silver 
object protruding from the accused’s closed fist. 
Believing it to be the handle of a knife, the 
officer ordered the accused several times to 
drop it. He refused and the officer took him to 
the ground with a leg sweep. A shiny object and 
plastic container dropped from the accused’s 
hand.  
 
The accused failed to show his hands despite 
instructions by the officer. He was struck twice 
and then handcuffed. The accused was arrested 
for possession of a dangerous weapon. The 
officer examined the dropped items, a chrome 
lighter and a plastic container with cocaine in it. 
The accused was re-arrested for possession of 
cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and read 
his Charter rights.  
 
The accused applied to have the evidence 
excluded in British Columbia Provincial Court 
arguing he was detained by police without 
reasonable grounds and that his rights under ss. 
8, 9, and 10 of the Charter were violated.  
 
Judge A. Rounthwaite first reviewed the 
applicable case law, noting the following: 
 
1.   police officers may briefly detain 
individuals whom they have reasonable 
grounds to suspect are connected to a 
particular crime, if the detention is 
reasonably necessary when viewed 
objectively, as well as subjectively;  
  
2.   police officers may engage in a protective 
pat down search of detained individuals 
where they believe on reasonable grounds 
that their safety or the safety of others is 
at risk.; and 
  
3.    where there are reasonable grounds for 
arrest, viewed subjectively and 
objectively, officers may arrest and 
conduct a search incidental to arrest in 
order to obtain evidence, to prevent 
escape, or for safety. [para. 6] 
 
She then went on to hold the entire encounter 
lawful:  
 
I found [the officer] was entitled to “check” 
[the accused] by approaching him and engaging 
in conversation, although [the accused] was not 
obliged to answer questions. 
 
Upon seeing what he reasonably thought was 
the handle of a knife held in [the accused’s] 
closed fist, after midnight, in a neighbourhood 
with a high incidence of prostitution and drug 
trafficking, [the officer] had reasonable 
grounds, viewed subjectively and objectively, 
to suspect he was committing the offence of 
possession of a dangerous weapon and to 
detain him for investigation of that offence. 
 
I accepted the officer’s evidence that he was 
vulnerable to a man with a knife as he sat at 
the open window of a car, and found he had 
reasonable grounds to believe his safety was 
at risk. For his own protection, [the officer] 
was entitled to instruct [the accused] to drop 
the knife and show his hands, a form of 
protective search less intrusive than a pat 
down. When [the accused] failed to show his 
hands, the officer was entitled to use 
reasonable force to ensure he was not armed 
with a weapon. On the evidence in the voir 
dire, [the officer] did not use more force than 
was necessary for this purpose. 
 
Although counsel approached this as an 
investigative detention case, I found on the 
evidence that the officer also had reasonable 
grounds, viewed subjectively and objectively, 
to arrest [the accused] for possession of a 
dangerous weapon once he formed the belief 
that [the accused] was in possession of a 
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knife. On the evidence, [the officer] did not 
just suspect [the accused] possessed a knife, 
he believed it, and his belief was reasonable. 
He was therefore entitled not just to detain 
[the accused] for investigation, but to arrest 
him for possession of a dangerous weapon. 
Instructing [the accused] to show his hands 
and using force to ensure he was not armed 
were therefore also justified as part of the 
arrest and search for weapons incidental to 
arrest. 
 
I found [the officer] advised [the accused] of 
his Charter rights under s. 10 (a) and (b) as 
soon as practicable.   [paras. 7-11] 
 
Since there were no Charter breaches the 
evidence was admissible.  
 
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca 
 
ONLY DIRECTING MIND 
NEEDS REASONABLE 
GROUNDS 
R. v. Hall, 2006 SKCA 19 
 
Two police officers reviewed 
summaries of wiretap 
conversations obtained during a 
long-term and ongoing cocaine 
trafficking investigation. The information 
indicated that on a particular date the accused 
and another female would be driving a particular 
vehicle on a particular highway transporting 
cocaine. One of the officers told a constable 
where the vehicle would be going, who was in it, 
that it would contain cocaine, and provided a 
vehicle description. However, the officer did not 
tell the constable what had been said in the 
wiretaps because she did not want to 
compromise the ongoing investigation.  
 
The constable saw the vehicle speeding, the 
passenger not seat belted, and an infant child 
being moved from the front to the back seat. 
The constable stopped the vehicle, asked for the 
accused’s driver’s licence and told her she was 
being detained for driving without due care and 
attention. The other female was arrested on an 
outstanding warrant and the vehicle was 
searched. The constable found rolling papers, a 
knife, and scissors which had marihuana residue. 
He then arrested the female and the accused 
for possession of a controlled substance. At the 
police station the police found two bags of 
cocaine in the infant’s diaper. The accused was 
charged with possessing cocaine for the purpose 
of trafficking.  
 
At trial in Saskatchewan Provincial Court the 
judge restricted the Crown from calling evidence 
from the officers directing the stop. He then 
ruled the constable intended to stop and search 
the vehicle before he pulled it over. In his view, 
the instruction given to the constable to stop 
the vehicle was, by itself, insufficient to provide 
reasonable grounds. The constable was not 
entitled to simply accept the directing officer’s 
opinion without satisfying himself about the 
facts. So, even though the constable 
subjectively believed he had reasonable grounds, 
the trial judge ruled he did not have the 
necessary objective foundation. As a result, the 
evidence was excluded under s.24(2) and the 
accused was acquitted. 
 
The Crown appealed to the Saskatchewan Court 
of Appeal arguing the trial judge erred. Justice 
Gerwing, writing the unanimous appeal court 
judgment, concluded the trial judge 
misunderstood the law by limiting the evidence 
the Crown wished to deduce from the officers. 
In Justice Gerwing’s opinion, “the 
misunderstanding related to whether or not the 
constable effecting the search had to have all of 
the details which would provide reasonable and 
probable grounds for the search or whether he 
was entitled to rely on instructions from 
superior officers who did have full information.”  
 
Justice Gerwing noted that the trial judge 
believed it was necessary for the constable 
himself to have sufficient information to 
conclude reasonable grounds existed. However, 
the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Debot, 
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[1989] 2 S.C.R. 1140, had previously ruled that 
the officer directing the search is the one who 
requires the reasonable grounds while the 
officer conducting the search can assume the 
officer ordering it had the necessary grounds to 
do so. Justice Gerwing stated: 
 
Based on Debot, the conclusions of the judge 
about reasonable and probable cause must be 
discounted. That is, he did not understand 
that it was not necessary for [the constable] 
to have full information to have such 
reasonable and probable grounds. He declined 
to hear the evidence which would show that 
the appropriate officers did have such 
information. [para. 23] 
 
And further: 
 
A search of the authorities does not provide 
much enlightenment on the nature of the 
precision required for the order to be given 
by the officer with information to the one 
who is to effect the search. This is not 
surprising since, given the exigencies that 
normally exist, shorthand instructions may be 
appropriate, and, indeed, normal. It is 
frequently stated that all of the information 
must be considered to determine if there has 
been a Charter breach. [para. 26] 
 
Since the trial judge did not give the Crown an 
opportunity to lead testimony related to this 
issue a new trial was ordered. A new trial would 
allow the issues to be fully analyzed in light of 
all relevant probative evidence.   
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
 
SEVERED HEAD ADMISSIBLE 
DESPITE EARLIER EXCLUSION 
R. v. Savojipour, 
(2006) Docket:C34438 (OntCA) 
 
The accused told police he 
buried the head and arms of a 
murder victim in a ravine. The 
Crown wished to present 
evidence that the injuries to 
the head were consistent with a hammer owned 
by the accused. During a voir dire in the Ontario 
Superior Court of Justice, however, the judge 
ruled the statement by the accused was 
inadmissible on Charter grounds. Since the 
inadmissible statement led the police to find the 
head and arms (derivative evidence), they too 
were not admissible because they would not have 
been discovered but for the inadmissible 
statement. The admission of the found body 
parts would therefore render the trial unfair. 
Thus, the discovery of the head or its condition 
could not be used in court.  
 
The defence, however, made reference to the 
inadmissible statements. The Crown objected 
and stated if further reference was made they 
would seek a new ruling on admissibility. When 
defence counsel suggested to the forensic 
pathologist that he took oral swabs the judge 
directed defence counsel to continue questioning 
without an answer to the question. Crown 
objected, suggesting they had been prejudiced 
because the jury would now know the head had 
been located and examined. From this, the jury 
would then infer that the Crown had concealed 
material evidence.  
 
Furthermore, the accused was expected to 
testify the victim had been struck on the head 
by two intruders and the jury might wonder why 
the Crown had not had the head tested. Or the 
jury might think the Crown could not rebut the 
accused’s testimony. The trial judge accepted 
that the defence counsel’s mistake was 
inadvertent, but refused to cure his mistake by 
a simple jury instruction. Rather, he reversed his 
earlier ruling excluding evidence about the head 
and the accused was subsequently convicted of 
first degree murder.  
 
The accused appealed to the Ontario Court of 
Appeal arguing, in part, that the trial judge 
erred in his ruling. The Court of Appeal, 
however, upheld the conviction. In ruling that 
the trial judge did not err, the Court held: 
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First, he was in the best position to assess the 
impact of the error in the atmosphere of the 
trial.  In our view, the conduct of the defence 
gave rise to a material change in circumstances 
that justified a reversal of the earlier ruling…  
The evidence that had initially been excluded 
in order to preserve the fairness of the trial 
was now admitted to restore the fairness of 
the trial process.  There was clearly a risk 
that the jury might be misled or presented 
with a distorted picture.  The argument that 
the “sins” of defence counsel were improperly 
visited upon the client is not valid.  Absent a 
finding of ineffective assistance of counsel, 
which is not suggested here, the client is fixed 
with the steps taken in furtherance of his 
defence. 
 
Second, we do not propose to second guess the 
trial judge in concluding that the perception 
that the Crown was suppressing relevant 
evidence could not be cured through judicial 
instruction. 
 
The new ruling made it possible for the jury to 
know that the [accused] had led the police to 
the location of the head, a matter of some 
importance to the defence as it did not want 
the jury to think that the [accused] had 
hidden the head and thus prevented the 
victim’s family from holding a proper burial.  
Furthermore, the [accused] in his testimony 
stated that when he returned to his 
apartment he saw the hammer in his apartment 
and that there was blood on it.  This left the 
possibility that the assailants had used the 
hammer while the [accused] was absent from 
the apartment.  The matter was clearly and 
fairly dealt with by the trial judge in his 
charge.  Overall, trial fairness was restored 
and the [accused] was not prejudiced by the 
admission of the head of the victim into 
evidence. [reference omitted, paras. 15-17] 
 
The appeal was dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.ca 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
Correction does much, but encouragement does 
more—Goethe  
PRESENCE OF NON-POLICE 
PERSONNEL DURING SEARCH 
NOT UNREASONABLE 
R. v. Tran, 2006 BCPC 0054 
 
After police entered a residence 
with a search warrant and 
confirmed the existence of a 
marihuana grow operation, a 
hydro inspector, two by-law officers, and the 
fire department were called to the site to deal 
with safety issues. The grow operation was 
sophisticated. Wiring was exposed throughout 
the house, vents had been cut in the walls and 
ceiling, and rooms had been converted into 
nutrient and electrical areas. These personnel 
were allowed to examine the premises without 
direct supervision.  The hydro inspector located 
a by-pass and a non-occupancy notice was posted 
by a bylaw officer because the residence was 
unsafe.  
 
During a voir dire in British Columbia Provincial 
Court on charges of electricity theft and 
cultivation, the accused argued, among other 
grounds, that the manner of the search was 
unreasonable because non-police personnel were 
allowed into the residence without explicit 
authorization. Judge Hoy, however, disagreed. 
“In my view the officers concerns for safety, 
not only for themselves, but as well the 
residence and the neighbourhood, are well 
founded,” he said.  
 
In coming to his conclusion Judge Hoy reviewed 
ss.11(6), 11(8), and 12 of the Controlled Drugs 
and Substances Act (CDSA). Section 11(6), in 
part, allows police executing a warrant to seize 
items not mentioned in the warrant if they have 
reasonable grounds to believe the things are 
offence related property or will afford evidence 
of a CDSA offence. Section 11(8) allows for the 
seizure of items if there are reasonable grounds 
to believe they were used in the commission of 
an offence or will afford evidence of an offence. 
Section 12 allows the police to enlist the 
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necessary assistance to exercise the powers 
described in s.11. In holding the accused’s rights 
not breached, Judge Hoy stated: 
 
…In order to carry out their duties the 
police, through s. 12 (a), are given the legal 
authority to enlist the help of others for the 
purpose of  collecting evidence, not only for 
offence related property but as well evidence 
for other  potential charges other than that 
contained in the CDSA.  For the hydro 
representative the evidence gathered was 
relevant not only to the CDSA charge but as 
well the Criminal Code offence of theft of 
electricity.  In either instance the hydro 
representative had not stepped beyond the 
bounds authorized by legislation whether it 
be his discovery of the electrical bypass or 
his making an assessment of the evidence as 
discovered by the police for the purposes of 
determining the excess electrical 
consumption.  
 
Furthermore, the ambit of the assistance 
provided also includes safety considerations.  
The police are entitled to ensure that their 
work is conducted in as safe a manner as 
possible.  Having secured the residence there 
are, in this instance, obvious dangers in the 
collection of evidence given the extensive 
electrical alterations, structural changes 
from the venting system and the presence of 
abundant quantities of plant nutrient 
chemicals.  It was a prudent step to enlist the 
help of a hydro representative, the fire 
department and the by law enforcement 
officers to ensure a safe environment in the 
collection of evidence. The police cannot 
reasonably be expected to have the expertise 
of electricians or firemen.  They do not 
possess the knowledge or necessary 
equipment to address any potential electrical, 
fire, chemical or structural hazards.  
 
It is noted the police did not directly 
supervise these individuals who were enlisted 
to assist them.  In spite of this I do not find 
that the search was thus rendered 
unreasonable.  It was not as if there was a 
complete void of control over their conduct.  
The residence was very crowded with 5 
officers involved in the search.  It is 
reasonable to state there would be some 
measure of scrutiny as they would have 
crossed paths with the police in the course of 
rendering assistance. [paras. 21-23] 
 
The evidence was admissible.  
 
Complete case available at www. provincialcourts.bc.ca 
 
HOUR LONG INVESTIGATIVE 
DETENTION NOT 
UNECESSARILY LENGTHY 
R. v. Dao, 2006 BCPC 0051 
 
A police officer, who had been 
involved in about 200-300 drug 
investigations, saw a man 
resembling the broadcasted 
description of a theft suspect. 
The man, who looked like a drug user, entered an 
alley way where prostitution and drug use were 
common. He approached a vehicle stopped in the 
alley and spoke to the accused through the 
driver’s window. When the men saw the police 
car they looked surprised. As a result of the 
location, what he saw, and the surprised 
expressions, the officer suspected the accused 
was engaged in a drug transaction. The officer 
called for backup as he watched the men speak 
briefly, go to the truck, remove an oil container, 
and then go to the hood of the car. The officer 
believed they were now putting on a show for 
police.  
 
Once back up arrived the police spoke to the two 
men. After about an hour the police confirmed 
the name of the man seen with the accused. He 
had initially provided a false name and his 
girlfriend brought identification to the scene, 
which was fake. Eventually, police determined 
there were two outstanding warrants for the 
man’s arrest. The arrested man then told police 
he had met the accused to buy $20 worth of 
crack cocaine and that he had been buying from 
him for the past four months. The officer then 
arrested the accused for possession for the 
purpose of trafficking, and advised him of his 
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Charter rights. The accused and his vehicle were 
searched and drugs and money found.  
 
During a voir dire in British Columbia Provincial 
Court the accused argued his rights under ss.8, 
9, and 10 of the Charter were violated and the 
evidence should be excluded under s.24(2).  
 
In summarizing the leading case law about 
investigative detentions and searching incidental 
to arrest, Judge A. Rounthwaite explained: 
 
While the defence must establish a Charter 
violation on the balance of probabilities, the 
Crown must prove a warrantless search 
reasonable. The leading cases on investigative 
detention and search incidental to 
arrest…establish the following: 
 
• Police officers may briefly detain 
individuals whom they have reasonable 
grounds to suspect are connected to a 
particular crime, if the detention is 
reasonably necessary when viewed 
objectively, as well as subjectively;   
 
• Investigative detentions must be brief, and 
police officers must tell detainees the 
reason for their detention.  
 
• Where there are reasonable grounds for 
arrest, viewed subjectively and objectively, 
officers may arrest and conduct a search 
incidental to arrest in order to obtain 
evidence, to prevent escape, or for safety.  
[references omitted, para. 3] 
 
The judge found the officer was justified in 
detaining the accused and that its duration —an 
hour—was not unnecessarily long. The length of 
the detention was driven by the detainees’ 
conduct. Judge Rounthwaite stated:  
 
I find at this point [the officer] had 
reasonable grounds, viewed subjectively and 
objectively, to suspect [the accused] was 
committing the offences of trafficking and 
possession for the purpose of trafficking in 
drugs. Applying the law…he was therefore 
entitled to briefly detain [the accused] for 
investigation. Undertaking the broader 
inquiry…, I consider that a reasonably based 
suspicion that a person is engaged in drug 
trafficking in an area where drug offences 
are common justifies [the accused’s] 
detention.  [references omitted, para. 7] 
 
And further: 
 
[The accused] was not handcuffed or searched 
during the detention, nor did he make an 
incriminating statement. 
 
This detention was not brief, but applying the 
decision of the BC Court of Appeal in R. v. 
Greaves, where a 40 minute detention was 
found reasonable and justifiable because the 
detainee’s conduct obstructed the 
investigation, I accept the Crown’s submission 
that its length was warranted by the officers’ 
need to investigate the inconsistent 
information the detainees provided to police. 
[paras. 13-14] 
 
As for the accused’s arrest it was also lawful and 
the searches conducted incidental thereto were 
reasonable: 
 
Having considered the law on arrest 
enunciated… I find [the accused’s companion’s] 
statement that he was there to buy cocaine 
from [the accused], combined with [the 
officer’s] earlier observations and the conduct 
of the men during the investigation, gave [the 
officer] reasonable grounds, viewed 
subjectively and objectively, to arrest [the 
accused] for possession for the purpose of 
trafficking. Although [the accused’s 
companion] had lied about his name, this 
explanation for his presence was far more 
credible, and far more consistent with the 
officer’s other observations, than the unlikely 
story that he was there to help [the accused] 
fix his car. [references omitted, para. 17] 
 
Even if the accused’s right under s.10(a) (as 
conceded by the Crown) was breached because 
he was not informed of the reason for the 
detention and assuming his s.10(b) right was also 
violated because police failed to advise him of 
his right to counsel, the evidence was 
nonetheless admissible. Judge Routhwaite ruled: 
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Would admission of the evidence bring the 
administration of justice into disrepute? The 
evidence was non-conscriptive and its 
admission would not affect the fairness of 
the trial. While “good faith cannot be claimed 
if a Charter violation is committed on the 
basis of a police officer’s unreasonable error” 
…I do not consider the violation serious. 
During the detention [the accused] was not 
handcuffed; questioning was limited to his 
name and relationship with [his companion]; 
and he made no incriminating statement. [The 
accused] was told the reason for his arrest at 
the conclusion of the investigative detention; 
his right to counsel was explained; and he was 
given a reasonable opportunity to consult 
counsel.  The charges are serious and 
exclusion of the evidence would lead to 
dismissal. In this case I believe exclusion of 
the evidence would bring the administration 
of justice into disrepute. Accordingly, I 
refuse the application to exclude evidence.  
[para. 23] 
 
The evidence was admissible. 
 
Complete case available at www. provincialcourts.bc.ca 
 
‘IN SERVICE’ LEGAL ROAD 
TEST ANSWERS 
 
1. (a) a 54 year old woman in Saskatchewan 
driving a minivan downtown —see Transport 
Canada’s recently released report, Surveys of 
Seatbelt Use in Canada (at p. 5 of this 
publication). Each discernible marker 
associated to a person in this example (age, 
gender, region, location in the vehicle, vehicle 
type, and locale) suggests they are more likely 
to be wearing a seatbelt. 
 
2. (a) true—see R. v. Rutten (at p. 7 of this 
publication). In this case, the court concluded 
that asking whether there were any drugs in 
the truck began a search, but such questioning 
was not justified as a search incidental to an 
arrest for an alcohol offence. 
 
3. (b) false—see R. v. Hall (at p. 12 of this 
publication). In this case the court concluded 
that the officer directing the search is the 
one who requires the reasonable grounds while 
the officer conducting the search can assume 
the officer ordering it had the necessary 
grounds to do so.  It is not necessary for the 
searching officer to have all of the details 
which would provide reasonable and probable 
grounds for the search. 
 
4. (c) Police—see Leger Marketing report 
entitled “Profession Barometer”, (at p. 19 of 
this publication).  
 
OBSERVATIONS CONFIRMING 
INFORMATION PROVIDE 
REASONABLE GROUNDS  
R. v. Murphy,  
(2006) Docket:C42133 (OntCA) 
 
A confidential informant 
provided information to the 
police describing a male, where 
and when he would be going to 
a specific location, and that he would be carrying 
cocaine while armed. Police set up surveillance at 
the identified location and observed a male 
matching the generic description given, heading 
towards the described location within the 
specific time frame provided. As the male ran 
across the street, he appeared to reach into his 
shirt and hold something in his pants, which the 
experienced officers believed was a gun. The 
accused was arrested and searched incidental to 
arrest. Police found a handgun tucked in the 
accused’s pants as well as cocaine.  
 
At trial in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice 
the judge treated the confidential information 
as equivalent to information from an anonymous 
and unproven source.  However, she concluded 
that the information provided by the informant 
along with the police observations of the accused 
prior to his arrest provided the requisite 
reasonable grounds. The search that followed 
was pursuant to that arrest and was 
constitutional.  
 18            www.10-8.ca Volume 6 Issue 3 
  May/June 2006 
 
In dismissing the accused’s appeal, the Ontario 
Court of Appeal found, in part, that the trial 
judge did not err in concluding there were 
reasonable grounds to make the arrest.  This was 
not a case where police surveillance did not 
confirm any material parts of the informant’s 
tip. Rather, the police observations of the 
accused as “he ran across the street provided 
significant confirmation of the informant’s 
statement that the [accused] was armed.” The 
informant’s information, along with the officers’ 
observations confirming that information 
justified the arrest.  
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.ca 
 
COPS TOP JUSTICE SYSTEM,  
BUT NOT BY MUCH 
 
In a March, 2006 Leger 
Marketing report entitled 
“Profession Barometer”, police 
officers were the most trusted 
profession in the criminal justice system2. Eighty 
one percent of Canadians trusted police officers, 
followed by judges (78%) and lawyers (48%). 
Lawmakers (politicians) were dead last at 14%.  
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Police 
 
Police officers were two percentage points lower 
on the trust barometer than last year and down 
seven percent from the five year high of 88% in 
2002. 
                                                 
2 The Leger Marketing Report provided trust ratings for 22 professional 
occupations.  
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The police were trusted most in Atlantic Canada 
(89%), but least in Ontario (78%). 
 
Judges 
 
The trust rating for judges rose six percent 
from 2005. 
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Judges were trusted most in Atlantic Canada 
(81%), but least in the Prairies (74%). 
 
Lawyers 
 
Lawyers were up three percent over last year, 
but continue at a level below 50% since 2003. 
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Lawyers were trusted most in Atlantic Canada 
(52%), but least in Quebec and British Columbia 
(47%). 
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Politicians (Law Makers) 
 
Politicians have dropped two points and have not 
been trusted by at least 20% of Canadians in the 
last five years. 
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Politicians are trusted most in Atlantic Canada 
(26%), but least in the Quebec (10%).  
 
Of the other 18 professions identified in the 
report, firefighters ranked number one overall 
with a 96% trust rating, ahead of nurses (95%), 
farmers (92%), doctors (89%), teachers (88%) 
and engineers (88%) rounding out the top five3. 
 
Complete report available at www.legermarketing.com 
 
EVIDENCE FLOWING FROM 
TAINTED DETENTION  
INADMISSIBLE 
R. v. Chaisson, 2006 SCC 11 
 
A police officer saw a lone 
vehicle with two occupants 
parked in the dark at the rear 
parking lot of a closed gas 
station just after midnight. Its 
lights were out and it was not running. There was 
a 24-hour donut shop and a closed restaurant 
nearby. The officer pulled up along the 
passenger side of the parked vehicle about three 
feet away. The occupants did not initially see the 
officer, but when they did they were shocked—
the driver threw something onto the floor.  
 
                                                 
3 The remaining occupations following teachers and engineers in order of trust 
were police officers (81%), judges (78%), notaries (75%), bankers (72%), church 
representatives (64%), pollsters (63%), economists (62%), senior public servants 
(50%), journalists (49%), lawyers (48%), insurance brokers (46%), real estate 
agents (42%), publicists (40%), unionists (38%), car salespeople (19%), and 
politicians (14%).  
The officer asked the men what they were doing 
and asked them to get out of the car. As the 
passenger exited, the officer saw, in plain view, a 
plastic bag containing marihuana on the floor and 
a small piece of marihuana on the seat. The 
accused, seated in the driver’s seat, was 
arrested and placed in the back of the police car 
while the passenger was also arrested and held 
outside the vehicle. The officer searched the 
vehicle and found two sets of scales in plain view, 
more marihuana under the driver’s seat and just 
over a kilogram of marihuana in the trunk. After 
the search was complete—about twenty minutes 
after the arrest—the accused was advised of his 
right to counsel. He was taken to the police 
station and searched further. In his pockets 
additional drug items were found.  
 
At trial in the Provincial Court of 
Newfoundland4, the accused was acquitted on a 
charge of possession of marihuana for the 
purpose of trafficking. In the trial judge’s view 
the accused’s Charter rights were violated. The 
detention was arbitrary since the officer was 
acting only on a hunch (a s.9 breach) and the 
officer should have cautioned the vehicle’s 
occupants before they were told to get out (a 
s.10(b) breach). As the judge noted, “But for the 
detention, the marihuana on the floor would not 
have been discovered [and b]ut for the 
marihuana on the floor being discovered, there 
would have been no right to arrest [the 
occupants].”  The warrantless search was prima 
facie unreasonable and infringed s.8 of the 
Charter. Although, in the words of the trial 
judge, the officer “served the community well by 
getting such a large quantity of drugs off the 
street,” the evidence was excluded under 
s.24(2).  
 
The Crown appealed to the Newfoundland Court 
of Appeal5 conceding breaches of the accused’s 
rights under ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter, but 
arguing the trial judge’s decision to exclude the 
evidence under 24(2) was in error. Justice 
                                                 
4 2004 N.J. No. 120 
5 2005 NLCA 55 
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Welsh, however, in authoring the unanimous 
appeal court judgment, rejected the Crown’s 
concessions of the Charter breaches.  Although 
the accused was detained when he was asked to 
get out of the vehicle, Justice Welsh found the 
detention not arbitrary.  
 
In her view the police are entitled to detain 
persons for investigative purposes provided they 
are acting within the scope of their duties 
recognized under statute or at common law 
(which includes the preservation of peace, 
prevention of crime, and protection of public 
order) and if the detention is necessary for the 
performance of the recognized duty (that there 
exists reasonable grounds to detain—formerly 
known as articulable cause). In holding that the 
detention of the accused passed constitutional 
muster, Justice Welsh stated: 
 
…I conclude that the officer did not 
arbitrarily detain [the accused] within the 
meaning of section 9 of the Charter. Given the 
location of the vehicle, the time of day, and 
the reactions of [the accused] and the 
passenger, exhibiting shock and apparently 
trying to hide something, the officer had 
reasonable grounds to suspect that the 
occupants of the vehicle were involved in 
criminal activity, and that a detention for the 
purpose of questioning them was necessary. 
The detention was conducted in a reasonable 
manner and was very brief in duration. [para. 
28] 
 
The seizure of the evidence in this case, Justice 
Welsh concluded, fell into two categories—plain 
view and search incident to arrest. Following the 
seizure of the plain view bag containing 
marihuana, the officer arrested the accused. 
The power to search incident to an arrest may 
include an automobile provided the police are 
attempting to achieve some valid purpose 
connected to the arrest, such as protecting or 
discovering evidence. Here, “the search was 
conducted in a reasonable manner and for the 
purpose of discovering and preserving evidence 
incidental to arrest,” said Justice Welsh. 
Similarly, the search back at the police station 
was also conducted in a reasonable manner and 
for a valid purpose incidental to the arrest.   
 
Under s.10(b) of the Charter an arrestee is 
entitled to be advised of his right to counsel 
without delay (which effectively means 
immediately) . In this case, the officer did not 
advise the accused of his rights until some 20 
minutes after arrest, which amounted to a 
breach.  But, contrary to the trial judge’s 
decision, Justice Welsh ruled the evidence 
admissible under s.24(2). The Crown’s appeal was 
allowed, the acquittal set aside, a conviction 
entered, and the matter remitted back to the 
trial judge for sentencing. 
 
The accused then appealed to the Supreme 
Court of Canada. The five member unanimous 
court allowed the appeal. In the high Court’s 
view, the trial judge was entitled to reach the 
conclusion he did based on the facts as he found 
them in holding the accused’s rights under ss.8, 
9, and 10(b) were violated. Furthermore, the 
trial judge did not err in finding that the 
cumulative effect of these breaches warranted 
the exclusion of evidence under s.24(2). In 
holding otherwise, the Newfoundland Court of 
Appeal erred in “substituting its own findings of 
fact for those of the trial judge.” The acquittal 
was restored. 
 
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca 
 
All past editions of this 
newsletter are now available 
online by clicking on to:  
www.10-8.ca 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
What counts is not necessarily the size of the 
dog in the fight—it’s the size of the fight in the 
dog—Dwight D. Eisenhower 
